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Basic Introduction
   to Scientific Flies



Based on the paper
Ranulph Glanville: as if (Radical Objectivism)
in: Robert Trappl (ed.)(1994), Cybernetics and Systems '94, vol.I, World Scientific, London


AS IF - Lyrics

(PRELUDE)
1 void (prelude)
Before we make experience   we are in the void   we are the void   there is no us
we are in the void          there is no us       In making us      we destroy the void.

The void is what we call that which is before us,   that which we cannot know
that which we cannot know                           that which is
(for the us we are always becoming until we reach the unknowable)
the unknowable.

Before we make experience   we are in the void   we are the void   there is no us
we are in the void          there is no us       In making us      we destroy the void.

It is that from which we come     and that to which we may, eventually, return.
To be is to continue becoming.    Through becoming, always, I am.
But, through becoming,            I distinguish myself into becoming
and thus all else:                you, and the distinguishing.

Before we make experience   we are in the void   we are the void   there is no us
we are in the void          there is no us       In making us      we destroy the void.


(DISCOURSE)
2  experience (What we have is our experience)
That is to say,
we are as we feel         and as we make sense of what we feel;
and we are as we sense    and as we make sense of what we sense:

that to be is to experience    and to experience is to be.
To think is to experience. To dream is to experience. To explain is to experience. To say is to experience.
Not the experience of, but experience.
For each     action, each    particular of being, each    distinction
is experience and is experienced.

we are as we feel         and as we make sense of what we feel;
and we are as we sense    and as we make sense of what we sense:

To utter (this) is             to assume     much of what is to come
We utter to make sense of feeling    and assume    sensation
and (and in) our senses
We utter to utter.    We utter of meanings     without communicating them.
We must utter         of that which is to come
to utter what is not to utter        that we can utter.
We utter        to explain ...  utterance, but also let it be.
We utter        to explain, for utterance is
explanation and explanation is
.... needed for utterance.

we are as we feel         and as we make sense of what we feel;
and we are as we sense    and as we make sense of what we sense:

Experience of   is not experience.
To utter        an explanation is an experience (of uttering),
but is not an experience of        that which is explained.
When we utter        an experience,
it is without conjunction: with conjunction it is
no longer    experience, it is
explanation.
In these dualities and (paradoxically) co-existent meanings lies the subtlty.


3  reality (We inhabit our experience, which is our reality)
That within which we are, that we inhabit
is our experience. It is our experience
as and how we construct (make) it.   We are
in our experience and our experience
is us. We are that experience        which we construct;
          hence we construct         ourselves.

We may call this    our world,

we may call it      our reality.
It is real to us, 
for it is all we are and all we have.     That is why
it is real to us (our world).             That is how
it is real for us.

(Our reality is our construction)
We ... construct... our ... reality. (Without us there is no our.)
Our ... reality...is not given. Without us, ...we have
no ... reality, for that ... reality ... is our experience,   and our experience
requires our presence and our acting.     Nor do we take
our .... reality ... : there is nothing to take. We make - construct.

We recognize             our experience through making it,
and through making it    as experience (making it experience) we experience.
If we do not make        experience of it, it is a phantom,
it is not ours, it is not (of) us.    Experience is not given nor is it taken
it is constructed:
and without constructing it, it is no experience
and hence (in our terms, that is in terms of our experience) it is not.

We construct            experience   by distinguishing it. That makes it both
distinct as its self, and distinct   as (an) experience.
(It appears, afterwards, to be around, but which cannot be around until it has distinguished -constructed-)

That is...
our ... reality ... is ours and is not   another's.
Our ... reality ... requires us: our presence.
We do the construction: it is of us and not of another.
Hence, it's unique. It is ours and not another's.
It requires us      because we construct it. Thus,
our ... reality ... is our construction, and
our ... reality ... is our construction.


4  difference (To know we are, we construct (with) others)
How can I    believe I am,     that I may    construct?
How did I    become so that         I can    construct?

To be is to continue        to become to be
To be is     continuous,    it is
the construction         and the construction    again
(and the construction of the identity that is construction of the equality of the two constructions, the construction and the construction again)
I become into being.       
I am,     continuing to be.    I become,     continuing,    to be.
How can I    believe I am,     that I may    construct?
How did I    become so that         I can    construct?

But to know         that I am    requires more:
    to know,    and that is I    that I know,
it is not enough    that I continue    becoming:
I need to become    by contrast to what is not me
(for otherwise the construction of the identity is only a construction of the continuity, a construction and (then) another construction: identity needs the possibility of difference: to be, to be something, requires the possibility of being not that something)
That is to be me    is to not be not-me
and not to be       the diff(e)rence between (also not-me) me and not-me.
That which distinguishes me        does so by distinguishing itself
from me             and not from what is not-me.
It collapses its own logic.
How can I    believe I am,     that I may    construct?
How did I    become so that         I can    construct?

To be me requires       that that identity
which is constructed    might be not-me:
it requires you - the not-me    that makes its own identity.
And it requires the means    of differentiation that is also not-me (and/but is not-you).
To make the difference  (that which makes the difference)
I need me and you       and that which makes the difference (here there is a triad)
- each a role,   for each I take to be,    to be distinct and thus to have
that-which-makes-the-difference   and that-which-is-separate
but might-be-me.
How can I    believe I am,     that I may    construct?
How did I    become so that         I can    construct?

And yet to know that it is me    requires that I construct me   and you   and the difference,
but that you do so, too:    me as a you to you,     me as me to me,     me as an assumed me to you
(an other, which cannot be experienced as a self)
- as you assume    I have a you that is you to me:    

a reciprocation    that makes both   you and me    to each   and both of us.   For each of us as our own I.
It is this    reciprocation   that makes construction, by me and by you    possible (by us).


5  observation (We each observe differently)
Our construction, which, when we wish to seem
to be looking outwards at,

we call our observations,    are ours    and only ours:
each of us observes    differently,
cannot observe         the same as the other.
To observe   is to be distinct, and to be present:
there is no observation (there is no construction) without the constructor.

As each observer is
separate, distinct, (mutually) constructed,

each observation and each construction is
separate, distinct, unique and of the constructor.

Because we are different and because we
cannot avoid our presence in observing, in constructing,

we must have different views.

We cannot remove ourselves from
our observation and from
the responsibilities they (come   
to) entail. We are alone.

There is no reality
we can examine "out there"   
because
there is no reality           without me

(so there is no objective reality),
all realities            are constructed (hence,inside),
and we     cannot approach     whatever might be out there,
or know of it
without being
present  and making it ours,
within.



6  utterance (Thus to know ourselves is to know another is to communicate)
To have you (that you are),  to have me (that I am) is still not to know.        
For me to know, me (to know that me) is to know another,
and to know
that the other        knows me.
To do this requires communication:
you and I acknowledge   
each other and acknowledge        both
this acknowledgement     and that each
is acknowledgin(g).

What we utter is not what is.
We take what is experience. We utter.

Our utterances we takes as referring - to that we wish to communicate.

What we utter is not what is:
there is the experience
and there is utterance,
and there is the putting together of the two in a relationship we assume to indicate identity
(If we utter about other utterances, then these utterances take the place of that which is - our experience -
and the utterances about them are the utterances)
An utterance can be - perhaps must be - an experience.
But it is experienced as an utterance    in identity    with that which is uttered (about).
The explanation       is not the experience,
although the explanation    can (must) be an experience,
in     and of itself.

What we utter is not what is.
We take what is experience. We utter.

What is uttered,     while it is,     is not that which is    to be communicated:
although uttering    has being, its role as uttering    is to transcend that being,
        to let it stand for another being.
(The situation may be reversed so that the other being stands for it, when the other being becomes utterance. This reciprocation and symmetry is essential.)

Thus, to re-    present    something    is     to present it:
for   to re-    present    something    is     to present it    (again?).


7  communication (We communicate by conversation)
Communication is (through)    a reci    procation.
The reci  procation     of being (I     and you),
the reci  procation    of presen  tation.
There is     another    reci  procation,     that     of conver  sation.

When I utter,         I identify     two experiences
and use one to communicate        the other    to you - an other.

Thus, one experience explains (describes, presents)   the other.
The identity is in and of my construction: relationship enters my constructing.

What I utter to you,    you construct in your own way.
But, to know you have done this    requires that you utter,    in response.
For the construction of identity is mine,     and not of the experience.
Communication    depends upon the ability of both
to construct an (acceptable) identity.

For me to know I have communicated    requires that you utter       
your identity in return to me,
and for me to construct for myself        your identity,
so that I make both your and my identity the same:
that is, I   identify the identity   I first made   with the identity
I construct from my utterance (I believe) you made        from the identity (I believe)
    you made    in response to my original utterance of the identity.
If I find    I cannot make       an identity
(schnell) of my utterance   from your utterance   returned to me with my (original) utterance,
I have to utter anew   until I have an utterance in response  
with which I can make     such an identity.
(This is the circular form of the ngociatory feedback of the conversation)

This process of identification is the basis of semiotics.
The process of identifying the identifications  is the basis of conversation.
A conversation is a negociation.



8  shape (We cannot observe what is)
My utterance consists in        my identi    fying
two constructions,        two distinctions,  two experiences,
such than one                   may stand    for the other.
In doing this, it is possible for me
to use the one to stand for the experience
that I wish to comunicate.

This does not mean
I can ever observe    what you observe,
      experience      what you experience:
these are ours        (yours and mine)
and cannot be either  given or taken.

Nor can we observe an is   without our constructing it  as an is.
There is           no is   without us to construct it   as being.

A metaphor:    it is as if
we look at the screen on which there are shapes in silhouette dancing.
               it is as if       
We see the silhouettes and we believe there is something behind them that causes them to dance
some puppet    (and puppeteer)     and some light   
that casts the silhouette we see (This is the Wayang Theatre of Java)
               it is as if       
But we cannot  (and must not)  see behind the screen:
and our vision is formed  and made possible  because of the screen.
               it is as if       
This is what we have invented,  what we have constructed.
Our way of looking   which makes communication possible,
makes contact with the supposed puppet behind the supposed screen impossible.
               it is as if       
And,    
if we cannot look beyond the screen,

we have no way to know what is there,
whether there is anything at all,
or even if there
is a behind.


9  reference (We cannot determine whether there is a reality "out there")
Our experience    may never be taken    to be    of things.
Our experience    is constructed        as we    distinguish.
When we distinguish,  we may think of  (or even call)
that which we have distinguished       
a thing,
give it a name (make an utterance that expresses an identity).

Whether or not we are
what we (popularly) refer to as things
in the real world
is beyond our competence,   in this understanding.

There is no is until we distinguish it,

and whatever we may wish to utter as being
is only our construction.

To talk of an "out there" reality
is to exceed the scope of our competence.


We          cannot determine it:         
that is, we cannot claim it exists or it does not,
        and it should not concern us.

Whether or not we are
what we refer to as things
in the real world
is beyond our competence,   in this understanding.

We          have reality if we want, in our experience,
but we      have no recourse to an external and objective existence,
free        from our involvement.
That objective world we have traded
in its figment and fallacy.


But that such things have a semblance
we deny at our peril,
even if to discuss it is beyond the scope of this paper.


10 meaning (We communicate in conversations)
We believe that we can
communicate with and can
understand each other.

We believe that we don't
always need to take so long
to negociate all that
we wish to discuss.

The convolutions  of the conversation's    negociatory feedback
are not always    or very often            needed.
In practice, we (believe we) do communicate,  and communicate quite well.
We do this   by directing    the feedback     so that we reduce   errors,
rather than  by just         randomly trying  again.
To direct the feedback,      we must  talk of understandings
as if they were shared.

(We make meanings)
What I propose          you construct in your own way.
You make your meaning.  To ask whether your meaning   
and mine are the same   is pointless, without meaning
There is no way to compare meanings
because they can only be examined  through utterances from which we generate them (and not in themselves),
because they only exist in the context of our making, and
because each meaning    is made privately by, for, within each of us.

Meanings are never open     to examination.
To attempt to examine them  is to misunderstand them.

(We share)
Yet there are times when we believe we do    share,
and such is the appearance that we can forget how we construct and utter,
and believe there is a reality "out there".
Such times when we consider    that we recognise the same value,  
for instance in judging art.

There are explanations for this, many constructions.
But these do not affect the feelings.
And we do, no matter how improperly,
treat such
recognition as if it where some thing (eg, a quality).
We talk of sharing this thing.

We talk as if.

(A conversation is not enough)
When we think of the conversation,   we talk of the conversation about.
About indicates that there is an agreed stratum
on which the
conversation develops conversation
is not enough.



11 talk (We utter as if of things)
There is a wish and a tendency
to treat the word as a concept (its meaning),

to identify  utterance with experience:
to treat     utterance as if it were experience.
Utterance can be experienced, but it is not experience,
or, at least, it is not the experience     
that is being uttered about.

When the utterance is the experience,     
it is no longer the utterance in question, used as the experience.
(There is another triad here: the two identifieds and the identifying.)

We talk as if: 
as if the utterance were the experience.
It is not.
But it is convenient to treat it as if.
Thus we utter as if of things.

There is a wish and a tendency
to treat the (constructed) experience
as if shared.
It is not,
in the strictest sense, shared.
What we may take as an isomorphism
is created by each participant,

accepted as adequate,
and distinguished as experience.

We then claim
that the experiences are the same,

although they cannot be.


12 structure (Our reality is our construction)
We face a difficulty
with our constructing, a
difficulty
that is found in common expression. The
difficulty
is that of the metaphor of the
Wayang Theatre.
We have a screen, but the screen is only a screen
and the silhouette only a silhouette   
when we assume the puppets and lights (and puppeteer), and the behind.
And we do assume them,
to make our metaphor(s) work,

and to assist us
in working pragmatically and more effectively.


We describe a world as if:
and we forget that it is as if   

and contrarily treat it as is.

But we need (and we appreciate) the as if.   
And so we need to our construction of how we construct,
so that we postulate such entities:
entities that explain and let be,

without confounding the constructive world, that permit, in their invention,
that we can believe as if they exist
as common reference points which yet can support the difference in view
that we all have -
not just as a matter of choice of a form of description,
but structurally,
as a matter of the necessity of their functioning,

reflecting our presence in their functioning,
just as we are needed to (and cannot escape from) construct(ing) our realities.

We describe a world as if:
and we forget that it is as if   

and contrarily treat it as is.

Such entities have been designed and formulated.
They are called Objects.
This is not the place to do more than introduce them and to assert that they answer these requirements.


We describe a world as if:
and we forget that it is as if   

and contrarily treat it as is.

Acceptance of them is the acceptance of a radical objectivism:
an objectivism
that is fuelled by the as if,
which supports construction and constructivism,

but which marries with our common experience
and with the pragmatics of convenience.

It may be indicated as objective
in the sense that it is made of Objects,

and it is radical
in the sense that the Objects (and the objectiveness)

are constructive
and have history on their side.


We describe a world as if:
and we forget that it is as if   

and contrarily treat it as is.


(FINAL WORDS)
13 final words
I don't pers(o)nally mind        about the nature of the world
the direction of its projection  its object and its objects,
whether it is                    real or ideal.

In becoming simpler, clearer in English towards the end,
I hope that the process of the creation of an as if world
of radical Objects,
the construction
of radical objectivism,
is paralleled in the benefits that accrue
from its construction.

I don't pers(o)nally mind        about the nature of the world
the direction of its projection  its object and its objects,
whether it is                    real or ideal.

I care that  I can communicate, that I can believe I am    and that I am distinct.
I care that we can communicate, that I can believe I am    and that I'm unique.
And, in fact, I need to communicate       to be able to believe that.
I care that  I can communicate, that I can believe I am    and that I am distinct.

I don't pers(o)nally mind        about the nature of the world
the direction of its projection  its object and its objects,
whether it is                    real or ideal.

I care that I can communicate, that I can believe I am         and that I am distinct.
I care that I can communicate, that I can believe I am         and that I am distinct.
I care that I can communicate, that I can believe I am         and that I am distinct.